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Johnston: The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-ManagementTheory and

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERSTATE SECURIT Y
CRISIS -MANAGEMENT THEORY AND PR AC TICE
IN CHINA
Alastair Iain Johnston

A

s the frequency and scope of China’s paramilitary and military presence
activities in the East and South China Seas have increased in the last few
years, officials and analysts inside and outside China have worried more and
more about the potential for military crises erupting between China and other
actors. Given the perceived high stakes of many of these potential disputes—they
touch on sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and development resources—some observers are concerned about the risks of escalation to military
conflict, whether deliberate or accidental.1 Adding to the worries is uncertainty
about China’s commitment to crisis management and escalation control.2
The purpose of this article is to help fill the gap in knowledge about Chinese
crisis-management theory and practice. Focusing mainly on the evolution of
thinking in China about international security crisis management over the past
ten to fifteen years, the study begins with a short introductory description of
Chinese theorizing about the definitions and characteristics of interstate crisis,
about crisis-management principles, and about how crisis management fits into
the evolving military operations of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It then
analyzes factors in Chinese crisis-management theory and practice that might be
in some tension with these principles. Finally it examines some of the problems
that Chinese crisis-management experts themselves have identified in setting
up a leaner, more efficient, and better coordinated military crisis-management
decision-making system.
The bottom line is that China has developed a relatively large body of research on crisis management, work that more or less endorses the principles
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and practices developed by many American experts during the Cold War. Indeed, much of the Chinese research explicitly draws on the substantial body of
American literature on crisis management. Chinese experts have also developed
concepts (e.g., nonwar military actions) and scenarios (e.g., border instability)
that explicitly articulate roles for the PLA in crisis management distinct from
its traditional war-fighting role. But there is also considerable tension between
these principles and practices on the one hand and certain military operational
concepts in China on the other. In addition certain biases—hypernationalism
and visions of Chinese exceptionalism—are in tension with crisis-management
principles as well. Finally, crisis-management decision-making institutions,
mechanisms, and procedures are still relatively underdeveloped.
CRISIS-MANAGEMENT THEORY DEVELOPMENT
It is common in the United States, and to some degree in China, to hear commentators pronounce that in the Chinese language “crisis” (weiji) means “danger”
plus “opportunity.”3 According to some Western and Chinese crisis-management
experts, this is an inaccurate or facile way of understanding the term. Rather,
“crisis” comprises the characters for “danger” (wei) and for “decisive point/fulcrum [ji] between life and death.”4 Some believe it can also mean “danger” plus
“turning point” (zhuanji or zhuanzhe), a sense in which some positive outcome is
possible.5 Indeed, a seminal study of crisis management by the influential China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) notes that the EP-3
crisis in 2001 led the United States (and China) to improve Sino-U.S. relations.6
In contrast, much of the Chinese literature focuses on the negative nature
of crises. One of the first Chinese works on crisis management, published in
1989, refers to a crisis as the intensification of contradictions between states
that damages their normal relationship.7 It is a situation with some probability
of escalation to armed conflict or war, and where there is only a short period in
which to resolve the crisis. It is also common for Chinese sources to describe a
crisis as being situated between war and peace.8 One source is explicit that there
are three types of security situations: peace, crisis, and war.9 More recently, Yu
Qiaohua, a PLA crisis-management specialist at the PLA National Defense University (NDU), citing Chinese dictionaries, concludes that a crisis is a “hidden/
concealed disaster or danger, a moment of serious difficulty[,] . . . a dangerous
situation or stage where there is a possibility of war or armed conflict between
countries or political groups.”10 CICIR’s study calls a crisis a cut point in a line or
trend of normalcy and notes that after a crisis the situation rarely returns to the
status quo ante.11 A widely cited NDU study argues that the resolution of a crisis
means neither that complete cooperation has returned nor that the basic problem
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behind the crisis is resolved.12 In short, interstate-security crises occur between
adversaries and enemies, not between friends.
Generally, Chinese crisis-management experts characterize crises much
along the lines of standard American definitions. This should not be surprising,
as much of the Chinese literature draws extensively on the U.S. literature.13 In
the American academic literature Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld’s
definition of a crisis has been the most influential. They define it as a politicalmilitary conflict where decision makers perceive there to be a threat to important
interests, where stakes are high, where there is a growing probability of armed
conflict, and where there is perceived pressure to resolve a dispute before it escalates to war.
Chinese crisis-management experts have adopted this definition.14 According
to the 2003 CICIR study, crises have three main characteristics: threats to important interests (weixiexing), high levels of uncertainty (buquedingxing), and a high
sense of urgency (jinpoxing).15
According to a 2006 NDU study on crisis-management decision making, crises have five characteristics: they are threatening (weixiexing), sudden (tufaxing),
and marked by a high sense of urgency (jinpoxing) and high levels of uncertainty
(buquedingxing) but are controllable (kekongxing).16 A 2008 NDU study of military crises argues that crises have four characteristics: the possibility of escalation
to war (zhanzheng weixianxing), seriousness of threat to interests and costliness
of escalation (weixie yanzhongxing), uncertainty about the direction of the crisis
(fazhan buquedingxing), and urgency in handling it (chuzhi jinpoxing).17 And the
2015 edition of the NDU’s Science of Strategy simply adopts Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s definition of a crisis.18
In short, according to Chinese experts, crises are dangerous, given that escalation to war is a strong possibility, but they are controllable through the application of crisis-management principles and mechanisms, as will be discussed more
fully below.19 As I will discuss later, the claim that crises reside between war and
peace creates a potential set of missions for military power that are distinct from
major interstate war. The problem is that, according to many Chinese military
analysts, the PLA is still unprepared in terms of command, operations, and training to engage fully in crisis-management missions.
Types of Crises
Yu Qiaohua identifies six types of military crises: those between great powers,
those among alliance members or within political groupings, those between
major and minor powers, those between states with traditional adversarial relations or rivalries, those within states between political groups, and those induced
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by terrorism.20 These types can be aggregated into traditional interstate crises,
terrorism, and internal or domestic disorder (intrastate crises). Crises can be
further categorized as those that lead to war (where one or more states provokes
a crisis as an excuse for war), those that remain on the margins of war (where the
threat or escalation to war is used for bargaining purposes to coerce the other
side), accidental crises (where the crisis arises from unintended or chance events
and actions), and quasi-crises (where sudden events in the context of somewhat
conflictual relations precipitate a crisis but the probability of war is low, such as
the EP-3 incident in 2001).21
As for the causes of crises, aside from the occasional nod to historical materialism (e.g., the claim that interstate crises are mainly a function of clashing economic interests, U.S. hegemonic pursuit of energy being a major source of these
crises), Chinese crisis-management scholars identify a range of fairly specific
factors and examples.22 These fall into a number of categories from territorial
and resources conflicts (e.g., Diaoyudao, Dokdo, South China Sea issues, energy
disputes) to imbalances in, and the spread of, new military capabilities (e.g., nuclear proliferation in Korea and Iran, cyber weapons);23 the spillover of domestic
conflicts into other countries (e.g., ethnic separatism, terrorism, DPRK* collapse,
diversionary crises); unexpected military accidents and collisions; and the rise of
new powers with more points of potential conflict with other states.24
Crisis Management: Definitions and Principles
China’s crisis-management specialists commonly define crisis management as
involving the use of diplomatic, military, and economic means to establish an
advantageous position from which to reduce tension, minimize losses, and get
the adversary to compromise, all the while avoiding loss of control or escalation to war.25 Crisis-management policy, therefore, entails “a series of measures
to prevent and control the occurrence and development of crises.”26 These can
include, among others, building confidence and trust, increasing transparency,
strengthening contacts across militaries, prior notification of military activities,
participation in multilateral security institutions, deterrence (and sanctions),
summit meetings and regularized high-level mutual visits, hotlines, mechanisms
for arms control and disarmament monitoring, and the use of informal high-level
trusted emissaries.27 A recent NDU study argues that direct communications
between top leaders are more effective in restraining crisis escalation than sole
reliance on military deterrence or economic sanctions.28
Definitions and characterizations of international security and military crises
in Chinese research draw heavily from American academic and government
research. Senior Colonel Hu Ping of the PLA General Staff Department (GSD)
* Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; that is, North Korea.
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was a major figure in transmitting these ideas to the Chinese crisis-management
community back in the early 1990s.29 In 2003, CICIR’s breakthrough study on
crisis management praised the rigor and sophistication of “Western” crisismanagement research and the role it plays in influencing foreign policy.30 Based
on my own interviews with Chinese crisis-management specialists and from a
look at the references used in PRC scholarship, it is also clear that a 2006 book
coedited by Michael Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng on U.S.-Chinese crises—a
product of a collaborative project on crisis management between the Car
negie Endowment for InterAccording to many Chinese military analysts, national Peace (CEIP) and
the PLA is still unprepared in terms of comthe China Foundation for
mand, operations, and training to engage fully International and Strategic
in crisis-management missions.
Studies (CFISS)—has had an
important impact on crisismanagement research in China.31 The project has contributed to discussions
inside China on the question of intracrisis signaling and it has contributed to a
more critical self-evaluation of China’s own crisis-management practice. Most
important, however, it has helped propagate crisis-management principles inside
the Chinese national-security bureaucracies.32
In particular, from this exposure to American crisis-management theory
Chinese crisis-management theorists have converged on a set of principles for
guiding crisis-management practice. The first analyst to develop such a list
was Hu Ping, whose 1992 study, sponsored by CFISS, listed a range of dos and
don’ts, mostly derived from American crisis-management literature.33 Indeed, at
the time, some in the PLA criticized his work as too “Western,” as having insufficient “China” content. Judging from the frequency of its citation, however, this
initial assessment evidently has not stopped scholars from relying on Hu’s work.
Later, in 2003, the CICIR crisis-management group distilled Hu’s list down to six
principles: “seek peaceful resolution” and don’t think of punishing the other side;
“seek limited and realistic goals”; exercise restraint over one’s behavior; maintain
communications with the other side; handle issues separately (e.g., don’t engage
in issue linkage); and avoid zero-sum approaches to crisis.34
The CEIP-CFISS project mentioned above appears to have been important
in codifying crisis-management principles in China. The project participants
worked out a list of principles derived mainly from Hu’s 1993 book. By 2007, after
some discussion, these principles had been accepted by both CEIP and CFISS:35
• Communicate with the adversary clearly and constantly and be specific
about what is being demanded.
• Articulate limited goals; be prepared to drop unlimited ones.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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• Maintain military flexibility, respond symmetrically in your options; don’t
excessively pressure the other side, and don’t take the use of force lightly.
• Avoid excessively ideological positions; don’t threaten the other side’s basic
values, and don’t moralize conflicts of interest.
• Exercise self-restraint, including in response to provocative actions by the
other side.
• Do not issue ultimatums; ensure that the adversary can back down in a facesaving manner.
• Divide large issues into smaller, manageable parts.
• Anticipate unintended consequences of particular moves.
These principles, or variants of them, are routinely cited in the Chinese crisismanagement literature.36
Two additional principles are sometimes found in the Chinese literature. First,
the geographical scope of a crisis should be limited to the immediate parties to
prevent third-party intervention or internationalization.37 Internationalization
is generally considered a problem, because it can constrain freedom of action
by bringing in the interests of third parties.38 That said, Chinese specialists have
argued that China can play and has played a constructive third-party role in crisis
management (for instance, vis-à-vis the DPRK).
Second, China should respect international law, as international norms can
generally reduce uncertainty and thus reduce the volatility of crises.39 Two NDU
crisis-management specialists, however, raise the caveat that national interest
trumps international law. The main reason, it seems, for using international law
in a crisis is to mobilize international and domestic support for one’s cause. The
flip side is that egregious, blatant violations of international law in the name of
national interest put a state in a passive position and isolate it, constraining its
diplomatic and military options.40 Most recently a PLA study of military operations in crises suggests that if in border disputes China’s forces (maritime and air
included) operate outside its boundaries, it will have to abide by international
law, and the prior permission of highest-level decision makers will be required.41
Doing so, however, helps China gain the moral high ground.
Some of these principles are conditioned by the admonition that there are certain questions on which China cannot compromise or make concessions. NDU’s
Wang Yong lists these as issues related to national dignity, territorial integrity, or
national unity.42 Indeed, he and a coauthor argue that once a crisis has evolved
to a point where “core interests” are threatened, standard crisis-management
principles no longer apply and one has instead to use resolute methods to counter the adversary. Those methods include military means if necessary, though
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/4
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with restraint, such that the adversary’s core interests are not threatened.43 Yu
Qiaohua, for his part, includes these three in his list but adds others: long-term
national development, the stability of political power, and ethnic unity.44 He adds
elsewhere that “sovereignty is more important than everything.”45
In addition to the principles they now share with American crisis-management
theoreticians, Chinese specialists point to some that they believe are uniquely
rooted in Chinese historical experience. These are embodied in the phrase “just,
advantageous, restrained” (youli, youli, youjie), an axiom often cited as a guiding principle in China’s own approach to crisis management. Its meaning comes
from its historical origins in the anti-Japanese war, when the Chinese Communist
Party and the Kuomintang were fighting each other while at the same time trying
to collaborate against Japan. “Just” refers to the principle of self-defensive actions
(ziwei), that of not going on the offensive or attacking without provocation or
reason. In other words, it means exercising restraint even in conflict situations
but reserving the right to strike second, to retaliate. “Advantageous” refers to
the principle of seeking victory—that is, being fully prepared for struggle, while
avoiding unnecessary losses from pursuing overly ambitious goals. “Restrained”
connotes self-control in operations—not pursuing an adversary to a total victory,
refraining from escalation even after defeating an attack.46
It is, of course, unclear to what extent this axiom actually constrains China’s
crisis-management behavior. One argument might be that, like the language of
exceptionalism in the United States, the axiom is a self-justification of behavior
that in fact violates its principles. Alternatively, it could have a domestic political
purpose, that of justifying concessions (restraint) after a politically acceptable
level of demands has been made (just, advantageous).
Another principle that Chinese experts claim to be particularly salient in
Chinese thinking is the blending of crisis prevention and crisis management.
Chinese ideas on crisis management often include more-general proposals
about the need to promote economic development or political stabilization in
failed states and regions, to build trust, etc., before focusing on specific crisismanagement mechanisms. In my private conversations with them, some Chinese
crisis-management specialists have stressed the role that track II (that is, unofficial) diplomacy could play in allowing all sides to gauge the stakes at hand and to
enhance their determination to avoid confrontations. My Chinese interlocutors
have not been confident that these kinds of measures would necessarily resolve
major conflictual issues, such as those relating to Taiwan or the South China
Sea, but they believe they could reduce the probability of confrontation.47 Some
have suggested that joint risk-reduction centers, joint crisis-analysis projects, or
direct communications links between relevant military operations departments
in China and other countries could also be useful in crisis prevention.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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The Status of Crisis Management in PLA Military Operations
As they theorized about crises and crisis management in general, over the last ten
years or so PLA experts have begun to think both more conceptually and more
concretely about the role of military operations in international crises. Their
research appears to be moving from exploring (and even mimicking, to some
degree) American-based work to developing concepts of military operations and
of signaling more tailored to Chinese conditions.
The first official reference to a special PLA role in military crises or “sudden
incidents” (tufa shijian) came in the 2002 Government Work Report presented to
the National People’s Congress in March of that year. In it Premier Zhu Rongji
called for strengthening the PLA’s ability to fight self-defensive wars and deal with
sudden incidents under high-technology conditions.48 Two major real-world
developments appear to have dovetailed during the years 2004–2009 to push
forward this new focus on military crisis operations. One was a growing focus on
domestic crisis management and on emergency-response laws, institutions, and
operations in general. This impulse grew mainly from the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) experience in 2003 but also from problems experienced
in coordinating responses to natural disasters.49 In 2004 and 2005, in a flurry
of legislation and institution creation, offices in charge of crisis and emergency
response were quickly set up at all levels of government. Some of this legislation
specifically addressed the role of the PLA in domestic emergency responses of
various types.50 A second factor, one outside China, was the U.S. development of
the concept of military operations other than war (MOOTW). It may have played
a role in sharpening the PLA’s focus on organization and operations in external
crises short of war.51
As a result of these developments, in 2006 new PLA headquarters regulations
(silingbu tiaoli) were issued that for the first time identified the handling of sudden incidents as an important part of PLA operations and outlined the principles,
basic procedures, and important points of attention in this type of mission.52 In
the same year the top military decision-making body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), approved the Overall Contingency Plans for the Military’s Handling of Sudden Incidents.53 This plan identified five types of such contingencies
or events, the first being “military-conflict sudden events,” or military crises.54
The 2008 White Paper on National Defense was the first to use the term “nonwar
military actions” (NWMA), the Chinese term for MOOTW.55
The NWMA concept allowed the PLA to place crisis-management operations
into a three-category overall typology of military operations (see figure 1): war,
nonwar military operations, and foreign-military cooperation.
Crisis management falls in the NWMA category. Within this category are four
subtypes of crises, or sudden incidents, that could require the use of military
force:56
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/4
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FIGURE 1
THE STATUS OF MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN PLA NONWAR MILITARY ACTIONS

PLA OPERATIONS

PLA NWMA

land, ocean,
air border crises
(sudden
incidents)

war

nonwar
military actions
(NWMA)

terrorism

foreign military
exchange and
cooperation

domestic
social unrest

natural and
human-made
disasters

• Incidents involving challenges to China’s control over its land, ocean, or air
boundaries
• Incidents involving terrorist attacks
• Incidents involving domestic social unrest
• Incidents involving natural or human-made disasters.
According to Chinese experts, international security crisis management, as
generally defined by both American and Chinese specialists alike, applies mainly
to the first subtype—handling crises on China’s land, sea, and air borders.57 The
PLA’s role is also greatest in such crises. In the remaining three subtypes, in most
cases, the lead in the use of force would be taken by the People’s Armed Police
or the Public Security Bureau. The PLA should, it is argued, play a role in these
last three subtypes only when the crisis constitutes a serious threat to national
security—the lives, property, or security of the people—and only when ordered
to by the CMC.58
With regard to incidents involving China’s land, ocean, or air boundaries,
PLA crisis-management experts have identified a range of scenarios for which
they need to plan and exercise (and, as I examine later, the PLA appears to have
developed contingency plans for some of these scenarios):59
• Small-scale armed conflicts with other states over land-border disputes
• Small-scale armed conflicts over disputed ocean areas, over jurisdiction over
shoals and reefs, and over the exploitation of resources in exclusive economic
zones
• Small-scale military surveillance and harassment activities conducted by
foreign militaries along land, ocean, and air frontiers
• Terrorist or violent attacks along land and ocean frontiers by foreignsupported separatist and terrorist organizations
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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• Limited sealing of the border to prevent internal conflicts in other countries
from spilling over the border in the form, say, of refugee flows
• Mistaken incursions by foreign soldiers or personnel into land and ocean
border areas under China’s jurisdiction
• Accidental incidents that harm China’s interests, flowing from exercises and
military activities by foreign militaries along China’s land, ocean, and air
boundaries.
This effort to figure out where interstate military crisis management fits into
the spectrum of military activity is, potentially, an important conceptual development. It explicitly differentiates between the traditional PLA mission of using
force in wartime to annihilate the enemy, on the one hand, and NWMA, wherein
military power would be guided by the principles of crisis management, on the
other. While the distinction may be hard for militaries to maintain in practice,
especially those not having specially trained forces for crises and emergency
management, the making of this distinction by the PLA is, arguably, a step toward understanding that the use of force in crises has different purposes, different milestones, and different manifestations than it does in interstate war. PLA
specialists, however, complain precisely of the military’s difficulties in adjusting
to crisis-management practices, wherein goals are much more limited than in
wartime.60
The Institutional Development of Crisis-Management Research
Stemming to some degree from the 1996 Taiwan crisis, the bombing in 1999 of
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 EP-3 incident, there has been a
steady increase in Chinese scholarship on interstate crisis management. Much of
this literature is still very self-critical with regard to the sophistication of crisis
research. For instance, the authors of a recent volume on the military’s handling
of sudden events noted that crisis-management research and analysis tend to be
done by nonmilitary institutions about nonmilitary crises (e.g., natural disasters,
economic or social crises, etc.), while the PLA’s study of, and training in, crisis
management has tended to focus on counterterrorism, not on crises occurring
around China’s borders. The authors recommend, therefore, that the PLA set up
its own crisis-management research institute.61 Some PLA critics suggest China’s
practical ability to anticipate crises is hampered by unsophisticated techniques of
crisis early warning (e.g., the lack of databases and statistical skills).62
The first sustained research project on interstate-security crisis management
was started in the early 1990s by the China Foundation for International and
Strategic Studies, a think tank connected to the GSD’s intelligence department.
As noted earlier, CFISS published one of the first major analyses of crisis management, by Hu Ping of the GSD, in 1993. Since then CFISS has become a major
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/4
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player in the development of crisis-management concepts and their dissemination to the wider PLA and to the civilian foreign-policy community. It has collaborated with the U.S.-based CEIP on crisis-management discussions since the
early 2000s.
A second important site of crisis-management research is the CICIR, an
intelligence-analysis institute affiliated with the Ministry of State Security. In
2002 it set up a Crisis Management and Countermeasures Center. The idea for
a crisis-management research capacity was first broached around 2000, and the
EP-3 incident and 9/11 attacks in 2001 soon underscored the importance of such
a center. Analysts from other research offices and centers at CICIR are allocated
on a part-time basis to the center. A handful of analysts focus mostly on crisis
management, including domestic disaster response; they mostly come from the
American Studies Institute, the Information and Social Development Institute,
and the Arms Control Institute.63 Judging from citations, the center’s important
2003 book on interstate crisis management has had a major impact on crisismanagement research in China.
Another important institutional support for crisis-management research is
the NDU’s Crisis Management Center, set up in 2004. It is clear that much of the
more authoritative open literature on crisis management comes from this center
or its affiliated scholars. It has produced research on crisis-management theory,
decision making, and early warning, among other topics.
Finally, the General Logistics Department (GLD) appears to be another important site for crisis-management theory development. Specialists associated
with the GLD are writing about the operational details of command and control
in crisis situations, in part because the GLD is responsible for timely responses
to internal natural and man-made disasters, as well as pandemics and epidemics,
by virtue of its control of the military medical system. In addition, traditional
military crises require the GLD to ensure the rapid delivery of appropriate logistics support.
Chinese crisis-management theorists have adopted and developed principles
that, if internalized by top leaders, should lead to restraint in interstate crises.
Chinese writings suggest that crisis management requires empathy, clarity, and
non-zero-sum perceptions of the issues at stake, especially in an era of nuclear
weapons.64 This view is quite close to the American literature on crisis management. Indeed, much of the Chinese approach appears to draw directly or indirectly from U.S. theory and practice. The authors of a recent NDU study were
clear that proactive American research into crisis management and crisis prevention was “one important reason” for relatively successful U.S. handling of crises in
the 1990s and after (such as the first Gulf war and Kosovo) and for its victories in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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recent limited wars.65 The authors suggested that the relative U.S. success had to
do with adherence to the key principles of crisis management.66
Despite the convergence in many crisis-management principles and the rather
steady development of research capacity, some PLA experts complain that there
is still insufficient emphasis on practical and implementable crisis-management
mechanisms.67 Moreover, these theorists recognize that crisis management requires the military to think differently about the use of the military instrument.
They understand that the PLA needs to be able to operate at levels of violence
below that for which it has organized and trained in the past. But there are some
major ideological, political, and military operational obstacles to the application
of crisis-management principles. I take these up in the next section.
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN CHINA’S CRISIS-MANAGEMENT
PRACTICE
There is considerable tension between many of the concepts and principles in
Chinese crisis-management thinking, on the one hand, and some of China’s approaches to certain security problems, as well as certain military concepts and
operational practice, on the other. Some of these tensions and contradictions
are recognized as such by Chinese experts. Some are not. Many of them are not
unique to China, of course.
Threats to Sovereignty and Territory
A central feature of China’s crisis-management behavior is sensitivity to perceived
threats to the nation’s sovereignty and territory. Concretely, this means that Chinese leaders have been more risk acceptant, harder to deter, and more likely to
escalate coercion on issues related to the defense of territory and external and
internal sovereignty than on other “national interests.” In crises involving these
matters it may be harder for them to preserve a limited-stakes perspective or to
accept mutual concessions. Indeed, since around 2004 territory and sovereignty
questions have been labeled “core interests,” analogous to what Americans might
call “vital interests.” Thus far the content of core interests has been relatively
stable. They include PRC control over Xinjiang and Tibet and the prevention
of a de jure independent Taiwan, as well as, more generally, the preservation of
China’s current political system, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and sustainable
development.68 For some experts, the frequency of crises will increase as Chinese
power increases and the scope of the nation’s interests expands.69 Others recognize, however, that in multilateral nontraditional-security crises, China may have
to downplay its emphasis on absolute sovereignty.70
This determination to protect territory and sovereignty is neither new nor
unique. It is, for one thing, evident in China’s past crisis behavior. According
to the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set, Chinese propensity to crisis
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/4

6886_Johnston_Lead.indd 40

12

12/9/15 1:47 PM

Johnston: The Evolution of Interstate Security Crisis-ManagementTheory and

JOHNSTON

41

FIGURE 2
FREQUENCY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY CRISES, 1949–2007
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was at a peak in the 1950s and the 1980s. In the 1950s the key issues were Korea
and Taiwan;71 in the 1980s they were land and ocean disputes with Vietnam (see
figure 2). The ICB data show that the majority of China’s crisis involvement has
been related to territory. This pattern is not uncommon for new states trying
to establish the credibility of their control over boundaries or for states whose
nationalism posits victimization at the hands of colonialism.72 It would explain,
for instance, the similarities between democratic India and nondemocratic China
shown in figure 3.
Given the importance of territory for security and as a symbol of sovereignty,
it is also not surprising that the level of coercion occurring in territorial crises
tends to be higher than in nonterritorial ones. In crises where the main values
threatened were territorial, violence was China’s preeminent response in 50 percent of the cases. Otherwise, violence was preeminent in 33 percent of China’s
responses (see figure 4).73
What might explain China’s greater willingness to use violence in territorial
crises? For the prereform era, the militarism inherent in Maoist ideology might
be a reasonable hypothesis. The fact, too, that U.S. containment policy in East
Asia was particularly and proactively coercive (at least as judged by China’s leaders) may be part of the story. In the postreform period, we do not have a very
large number of crises on the basis of which to test various explanations. Since
many crises in the post–Mao Zedong era have involved Vietnam or Taiwan, the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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FIGURE 3
COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT ISSUES AT STAKE IN CRISES
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FIGURE 4
RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF VIOLENCE AS PREEMINENT RESPONSE IN INTERNATIONAL
CRISES, CONDITIONAL ON TYPE OF THREAT
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high level of coercion employed may have to do with the zero-sum nature of
disputes over territory.
It is a little hard to know what to infer from these data about China today,
since, as of the most recent data from the ICB (2007), China’s last crisis was over
the Taiwan Strait in 1995–96. Anecdotally, however, it does seem likely that the
relationship between territoriality and intracrisis coercion will continue to hold.
For instance, in my interactions with Chinese officials and analysts on crisis
management, they have implied that in crises concerning territorial integrity,
should an adversary take the “first shot” (e.g., an actual warning shot or the first
use of, say, navy ships in place of coast guard assets) or threaten China’s actual
control over territory, Chinese decision makers may conclude that the issue has
moved from the realm of crisis management to that of escalation dominance. At
that point, force (framed as a “second strike”) becomes necessary to compel the
adversary to back down. Such a response would also help demonstrate resolve
against the prospect of any further escalation. Like their American counterparts,
Chinese leaders are intensely focused on the credibility of their resolve. In addition, it is not clear that Chinese leaders believe the crisis-management principle
of early and clear communications with other relevant actors applies to territorial
and sovereignty issues. In a territorial dispute, China might decline to initiate
top-level crisis-management communications with actors who are not themselves actual claimants (e.g., the United States with respect to China’s maritime
disputes), so as to underscore the illegitimacy of their involvement. The same
reluctance to initiate high-level contacts might also be on display in a crisis incident (e.g., a ship or air collision involving foreign military forces) occurring very
close to Chinese territory but outside territorial waters. The argument might be
that the illegitimacy of foreign hostile actions so close to China means Beijing is
not responsible for initiating high-level communication (though there are different views on this within China’s crisis-management expert community). On territorial issues the crisis-management principle of flexibility may also not apply.74
Blurring of Internal and External in the Concept of Comprehensive National Security
The Chinese crisis-management literature tends to draw no clear distinction
between internal and external contingencies. It acknowledges that internal crises
often spill over into external conflicts (as the SARS and certain nontraditional
security crises have suggested), and vice versa.75 Chinese analysts’ lists of the
crises in which China has been involved in the past or may be involved in the
future invariably include both external (e.g., the Korean War, the border war with
Vietnam in 1979, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in 1999, the DPRK
nuclear crisis of 2002, conflicts over ocean rights in the South and East China
Seas) and internal crises (e.g., Tiananmen in 1989, SARS in 2003, Taiwan independence, Tibet and Xinjiang separatism).76
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The focus on the link between external and internal crises, however, implies
that international crises can increase the intensity of any domestic legitimacy
problems then ongoing.77 In the view of one NDU study, external crisis affects
“comprehensive security,” which includes social and economic stability.78 The flip
side of this is that international crises can also have a useful secondary effect in
reinforcing domestic legitimacy and cohesion.79
Whether a crisis threatens or helps domestic stability, for Chinese experts
effective crisis management includes information management—constraining
and guiding public opinion and avoiding domestic public debate that “limits
the space for the government to handle the crisis situation.”80 Thus, according to
these experts, a guiding axiom should be to consider the implications of external crises for domestic political power and stability.81 As the 2003 CICIR study
put it, in crisis management the leadership needs to prevent a bilateral political
crisis from expanding into, or influencing, a domestic social one. Otherwise the
population’s emotional and fearful responses could constrain options. Therefore,
the authors argue, it is critical to manage the media and use them to guide public
opinion.82 Or in the words of the 2010 Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS) study, in crises “China’s policy propaganda to a large extent is aimed at
the internal population.”83 The risk for crisis management, however, is that this
link between external crisis and internal legitimacy can raise the stakes in a crisis,
making concessions harder. Indeed, according to some PLA authors, on issues
related to domestic stability and the unity of ethnic nationalities in China there
is no room for bargaining in a crisis.84
Another implication of the blurring of inner and outer has to do with how
some in China and outside view ethnic Chinese as potential extensions of PRC
power and influence. Some analysts see overseas Chinese as useful tools in crisis
management, particularly in information and perception management. They
recommend making use of overseas Chinese networks to make Beijing’s case in
a crisis.85 The downside for crisis management, however, is that other countries
might see their ethnic Chinese communities as tools or agents of Chinese power
and therefore as threats. For example, anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia have
historically been a source of tension in PRC-Indonesian relations; also, there
is survey evidence that a substantial minority of the U.S. population (around
30–35 percent) view Chinese Americans as less loyal to the United States than
to China.86 The risk for crisis management is that trying to exploit the presence
of overseas Chinese to lobby in favor of China’s position, or even creating that
impression, could lead to a backlash against them. In the American case, that in
turn could accentuate zero-sum, racialist, and ethnocentric perceptions in the
domestic politics of the bilateral U.S.-Chinese relationship, with concomitant
negative effects on long-term bilateral political stability.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/4
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The Need to Claim the Moral Upper Hand
A number of Chinese sources note that in a crisis the nation’s leaders need to
appear to hold a normatively superior position, to be seen as just (zhengyi) and
moral (daoyi). Preserving this image is considered a national interest.87 This may
explain the highly moralistic language used in crises. Some experts claim that one
of China’s strengths in international crises is its ability to mobilize external support through appeals to its normative superiority;88 others note that the targets of
this moralism are often domestic constituencies within China.
A corollary to moralism is the demand for apologies and symbolic concessions
from the adversary. In particular there appears to be a preference for adversaries
to accept responsibility before China acts to dampen the situation.89 This emphasis on putting normative responsibility on the adversary’s head is inconsistent
with the crisis-management principle of avoiding zero-sum ideological positions.
Moreover, to the extent that the notion of moral superiority is internalized, it can
lead Chinese decision makers to underestimate the perceived threat that their
actions can generate. In other words, it reduces the capacity for empathy and
perspective taking, and perhaps even the urgency to resolve the crisis quickly.90
Beliefs about Chinese Exceptionalism
Another apparently deeply held belief that could affect crisis-management
practice is the claim that, among the major powers, China’s people, history, and
current policies are uniquely peaceful and defensive.91 These essentialized traits
are rooted, according to many in China, in ancient political philosophy, such as
Confucianism.
This self-orientalization creates a problem for crisis management, however.
Social psychology shows that under conditions of perceived threat, the more one
believes that one’s in-group is uniquely different from others—even if one believes
this difference starts with its peacefulness—the more one is likely to hold a realpolitik worldview and to support realpolitik practices to resolve conflicts. At the level
of the individual, perceived threats to the in-group increase the salience of negative out-group traits. The more salient the out-group, the greater the perceived
identity difference with the Other. The greater this perceived difference, the less
empathy for the out-group, and hence the more competitive the relationship with
the out-group is perceived to be.92 This sense of competition tends to be related
to a view of the external world as dangerous to the group. This sense of danger in
turn is associated with a greater concern for relative gains, and a more zero-sum
perception of international politics.93 It is also associated with “attribution errors,”
a tendency to see one’s own actions as unavoidably defensive in the face of an
adversary predisposed to threaten. In a crisis situation, therefore, strong perceptions of exceptionalism may escalate stakes and limit options in more-coercive
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directions. This may be especially the case when perceptions of Chinese exceptionalism meet perceptions of American exceptionalism in a crisis.94
Absolute Flexibility (Quanbian)
The concept of quanbian infuses traditional and modern Chinese strategic thinking. It means, more or less, “weighing the situation and responding to [advantageous] change.” It is an axiom asserting absolute flexibility; any limits on acceptable actions are primarily political, not normative. This concept of expediency
appears as well in discussions about how much benefit one side can prudently
derive from a crisis. In the view of one NDU expert, one task of leadership is
to discover and exploit any advantages that might accrue from a crisis.95 This
requires that decision makers constantly search to see how benefits in one issue
might connect to benefits in another. According to one GSD analyst, this flexibility allows leaders to use small crises to prevent larger ones and to use larger
crises to prevent war.96
The question is whether, in practice, this emphasis on absolute flexibility reduces or increases the likelihood of crisis escalation. On the one hand, it could
reduce escalation pressures, because a prior knowledge of linked benefits allows
one to come to an agreement with the adversary earlier rather than later. On the
other hand, the constant search for maximum linked benefits could lead a side
to hold out for more, denying the other side any payoffs and thus increasing the
chances of escalation. While some Chinese crisis-management experts appear to
acknowledge this first possibility, they do not provide particularly clear guidelines for avoiding the second.97
Conforming to the “Overall Situation” (Da Ju)
The term “overall situation” refers to the general political and strategic goals of
the Communist Party. Conforming to the overall situation (fucong da ju) means
subordinating narrower or parochial interests to this primary purpose of state
action. More broadly, the overall situation can mean the objective trends in the
development of a situation, as correctly understood by political leadership. Some
crisis-management specialists believe that China’s strategic principle of subordinating coercion to the overall situation is a source of restraint in crises.98 To the
extent that the overall situation in, say, bilateral relations with another country
is to preserve positive interactions, this concept could dampen escalation.99 Dialectically, however, the “da ju” could have the opposite effect. From the perspective of da ju, military setbacks are not necessarily self-deterring if they either
do not negatively affect the party’s control over the da ju or can be construed as
supporting the da ju (e.g., losing tactically, but gaining strategically by standing
up to hegemonism). A common narrative in Chinese perceptions of the nation’s
strategic history is that “good guys” operate often as the weaker side and so lose
a lot of battles but win in the long run by focusing on da ju.100
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/4
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Weak-State Identity
Many Chinese crisis-management experts start with the assumption that China
is weaker than the United States. Despite the growth in China’s relative material
power in recent years, this still seems to be a commonly held heuristic; the standard for judging progress in acquiring power is often the United States. Accordingly, they believe, it becomes important for China to show resolve in the face of
superior capabilities and to be less transparent so that the stronger side (the United States) exaggerates Chinese capabilities, by which deterrence is enhanced.101
This concept of “asymmetrical transparency” (bu duichen de toumingdu) may
well enhance deterrence, but it undermines crisis-management principles. Some
analysts in the PLA are aware
of this tension or contradicA central feature of China’s crisistion.102 As a recent NDU study
management behavior is sensitivity to perput it, decision makers need
ceived threats to the nation’s sovereignty and
to understand the trade-off in
territory.
crises between hidden intentions and transparent communications. The admonition is that in general one
should not reveal one’s intentions but should also not let the adversary’s strategic
misperceptions persist if they are disadvantageous to oneself.103 Nonetheless, it is
not obvious from PLA writings how this tension should be resolved. That is, it is
unclear under what conditions one should expect ambiguity versus clarity. This
makes interpreting Chinese signals in a crisis difficult.104
Another problem for crisis management created by the weak-state identity is
that, for some theorists, weak states are, and should be, less constrained by crisismanagement principles than strong states. For instance, weak states are under
more pressure to show resolve, so as to compensate for limited capabilities. One
also hears the argument that the weaker side should be less constrained by crisismanagement principles because it needs more flexibility and maneuverability. A
weak state’s deterrence signals are easier to read. Since it cannot credibly threaten
to defeat the stronger side, there is a large range of threats it will not make. Therefore, the weaker side’s deterrence signals are, proportionately speaking, more
obvious than the stronger side’s. This line of thinking, however, can lead to overestimating the clarity of one’s intentions and underestimating the provocativeness
of one’s actions. In other words, it can reduce the empathy required to understand
the other side’s redlines and to predict unintended consequences.105
Tension between Crisis-Management Principles and Military Concepts
Experts acknowledge that the PLA is primarily trained and configured to fight
wars, not engage in crisis signaling. They tend not to go into detail about the
contradictions between these two types of military actions. One exception is
NDU senior colonel Xu Hui’s list of coercive-diplomacy tactics that could be
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useful in crisis situations (e.g., limited probes, faits accomplis, tit-for-tat retaliation, and clarification of bottom lines). He describes them as mostly involving
limited demonstrations of capability and will to capture the diplomatic initiative
and create coercive pressure on the adversary to back down. He is careful to point
out that conditions for successful intracrisis coercive diplomacy are quite limited,
and that in the heat of a crisis nonrationality, information problems, and rapidly
changing circumstances can lead to escalation.106 Indeed, a closer look at some
PLA operational concepts suggests obvious areas of tension or friction between
the principles of crisis management and how the Chinese military tends to think
about the use of force.
Windows of Opportunity/Vulnerability Logic. There is some evidence that in applying force in the past, Chinese leaders have been particularly sensitive to the
closing of windows of opportunity or the opening of windows of vulnerability.
They believe that force, even when China is relatively weak, can be useful in shaping the political environment early on, before political and military trends turn
even more unfavorable (wan da bu ru zao da—“fighting later is not as good as
fighting earlier”), in order to seize the initiative and emerge superior.107 There are
too few cases in the post-Mao period to determine how much this thinking has
persisted, but it would seem inconsistent with stabilizing a crisis situation.108
The Importance of “Creating Inexorable Momentum” (Zaoshi). Central in Chinese concepts of deterrence signaling is the notion of inexorable momentum,
whereby the adversary comes to perceive that unless it backs down China is certain to use decisive force.109 Instilling this perception appears to be mainly an
exercise in signaling willingness and intent to escalate—in other words, that the
adversary has lost its ability to deter. The risk here is that in a crisis over territorial
disputes, for instance, once a threshold of violence—real or symbolic—has been
crossed, escalation might be seen as a legitimate tool to force the other side to
de-escalate. The PLA concept of “war control” (zhanzheng kongzhi) seems to capture this process of creating “inexorable momentum,” by which, through credible
threats of escalation, the scope and duration of wars can be limited.110
In some PLA writing there seems to be a hierarchy of means for creating inexorable momentum. For instance, the latest version of the NDU’s Science of Strategy lists eight methods of signaling (moving from least to most escalatory): public
statements indicating a willingness to use force; raising of the level of weapons
preparations; displays of strength through publicized exercises; redeployment of
forces; raising of military alert levels; attacks on the adversary’s information systems (including cyber attacks); weapons tests and proactive disruption of the adversary’s military movements; and limited attacks as warning signals.111 Actions
at and above category five could be particularly escalatory in a crisis, since they
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss1/4
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would likely be viewed as marking a very dramatic shift in operational restraint
and official policy.112 Variants of this list of actions for creating momentum show
up in other PLA writings on deterrence, including a classified study of nuclear
campaign theory.113
Uncertainty as a Source of Crisis Stability (and Deterrence). In contrast to the
principles of crisis management, some deterrence thinking in the PLA stresses
the importance, initially at least, of a lack of clarity and transparency, on the
ground that uncertainty induces caution in an adversary (thus the importance of
“tricking” [qi di] and “confusing” the enemy [mi di] for deterrence purposes).114
Even some PLA authors on crisis management who acknowledge the importance
of clear signals also caution that this principle is not absolute. Rather, there are
occasions in a crisis when deliberately ambiguous signals can be used to ascertain
the other side’s bottom line.115
Controlled Hard-Line Policies. Another tension with crisis-management principles arises from the idea that the controlled escalation of force can enhance
diplomatic leverage and resolve crises to one’s advantage. Indeed, some analysts believe China’s uses of force in past crises are examples of successful crisis
management.116 As one author puts it, limited war—conveying that even higher
costs could result if a crisis is not resolved—is a potential tool of crisis management.117 Other Chinese crisis-management experts note the positive role of
military force for crisis prevention and crisis-management purposes. Yu Qiaohua
argues, for example, that operationally, military blockades, quarantines, and actual attacks are all potentially useful tools within a crisis, as long as “limits” (du)
are observed and the overall political purposes of crisis management guide their
use.118 Use of such tools would be a case of “using crisis to respond to crisis” (yi
weiji yingdui weiji).119 Wang Yong suggests that military preparations for war and
displays or flaunting of military power can enhance deterrence and thus serve
the purposes of crisis management. Deliberately fostering dissension and intrastate conflicts on the other side to enhance one’s political influence in a crisis is
also useful. In the diplomatic realm, Wang suggests, cutting off or suspending
diplomatic ties and trying to isolate the other side can on occasion be helpful
diplomatic tools.120 Chen Zhou, a major strategist at the Academy of Military
Science (AMS) and the lead author of China’s National Defense White Papers,
argues that under conditions of informatization, precision conventional weapons can take on strategic deterrence roles that nuclear weapons had in the past.
But conventional weapons cannot by their mere presence generate the fear in an
adversary that nuclear weapons can. Thus, unlike with nuclear weapons, actual
demonstrations of conventional weapons are needed to enhance their credibility
as instruments of deterrence.121
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To be sure, the use of limited military operations is treated cautiously by some
crisis-management specialists. Yu Qiaohua himself admits that there are risks in
using military force as a bargaining tool in a crisis: it can lock one into a chain
or cycle of escalation.122 SIIS crisis-management experts argue that given asymmetries in hard power, China cannot rely on military force as a first resort in
Sino-U.S. crises, even on the Taiwan issue, where the balance of interests favors
China.123 Still, these voices of caution highlight the arguments in favor of limited
uses of force to compel the adversary to back down.
Network and Electronic Integrated Warfare. Computer-network operations and
electronic warfare are of growing importance in PLA operational concepts. There
are at least three reasons why Chinese computer-network operations might make
it harder to contain crisis escalation. First, the centrality of computer-network
operations in the early stages of a conflict (to confuse and misdirect the adversary, disrupt command and control, and thereby seize the battlefield initiative)
may lead the target of such operations to assume they presage a major escalation
by the PLA.124 Given the importance for the PLA of controlling the initiative, evidence of Chinese computer-network operations in a crisis might be interpreted
by the target as a more aggressive act than warranted by the crisis itself. This interpretation, in turn, will make controlling escalation more difficult. In the case
of the United States especially, fears of attack on critical infrastructure, against a
backdrop of substantial offensive computer-network capability and policy guidance, might produce a large-scale offensive response. Second, the difficulty in
identifying culprits (attribution) in some cases can have an added escalatory
effect, because, given the apparent centrality of computer-network operations
in China’s conventional operations, adversaries may assume that false-flag or
third-party attacks are in fact Chinese. Finally, asymmetry between Chinese and
American (in particular) levels of confidence in attribution may also be escalatory. Compared with many American cyber-warfare experts, PLA cyber specialists appear to believe attribution is very difficult. This may lead them to morerisk-acceptant behavior in cyber, (overly) confident that operations will not be
attributed to the PLA. Conversely, the United States may be more risk-acceptant
in preemptive cyber attacks or cyber retaliation against China, confident that it
has identified the source of attack.125
PROBLEMS IN CRISIS DECISION MAKING AND RESPONSE
China’s experts in the field are, on the whole, quite critical of what they see as the
deficiencies in China’s crisis-decision-making process. Their criticisms basically
fall into two categories: first, top-level decision-making processes and institutions, and second, military command and operations.
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Inefficient Decision-Making Procedures
Prior to the recent establishment of the Central National Security Committee
in 2013 (about which more below), there was somewhat of a consensus among
Chinese experts that China’s crisis-management decision-making system was
inefficient and in need of a major overhaul. As NDU specialists bluntly put it,
China lacked an up-to-date national-security structure that could effectively
prevent or warn of threats or command and coordinate responses to them.126 The
danger of slow decision making was that crises could not be nipped in the bud
with political and diplomatic tools. There could be major negative consequences
—the longer a crisis festered, for instance, the more likely “hegemonic major
powers” (e.g., the United States) would intervene to China’s detriment.127
The problems started at the very top. It was widely recognized that the postDeng collective senior leadership slowed decision making by searching for
consensus, whereas the system had been designed to allow a stronger leader to
coordinate and enforce policy.128
In 2000, in an effort to streamline national-security decision making, the party
set up the National Security Leading Small Group (NSLSG), led by the party general secretary and comprising representatives of major national-security-related
bureaucracies. The NSLSG was set up with considerable hope that it might improve information flows and break down interbureaucratic barriers. However, it
proved a disappointment in practice, according to crisis-management experts. It
lacked legal standing and clear lines of authority. It was too slow, and insufficient
for cross-unit coordination.129 It tended to lack detailed plans and response rules.
In any case, as Chinese critics point out, “leading small groups,” although they
often exist for long periods, are by nature temporary responses to pressing problems. They are not designed to preserve lessons learned.130
In principle, policy options for the NSLSG to consider were to have come
from the Communist Party’s Foreign Affairs Office, the Foreign Ministry, the
General Staff Department, and specialized agencies, depending on the issue (e.g.,
the Taiwan Affairs Office).131 But crisis-management experts complained that in
practice these options were not sufficiently staffed—issues were sent to the top,
but options were not, with the result that China’s leaders had to debate the issues
at stake and determine the credibility of the information sent to them before
determining and then choosing between options.132
Furthermore, it appeared that even when a decision was made by the Politburo
Standing Committee (PBSC), there was no coordination mechanism to mediate
among bureaucratic or organization of interests and ensure implementation. In
a traditional military crisis, three basic groupings need to work closely together:
the State Council system (that is, the national government, through the Foreign Ministry) handles foreign-policy aspects; the party-affairs system handles
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

6886_Johnston_Lead.indd 51

23

12/9/15 1:47 PM

52

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 1, Art. 4

organizational issues (through the party Secretariat), propaganda (Propaganda
Department), and relations with external ruling political parties (International
Liaison Department); and the CMC system handles military affairs (through the
GSD).133 Horizontal coordination between these entities is very difficult without
explicit direction from the PBSC. The CMC will not accept direction from the
State Council on foreign or military policy. Other institutions as well have crosssystem authority, but their authority does not extend to the PLA. For instance,
the powerful National Development and Reform Commission, being at only the
ministerial level, can coordinate the State Oceanic Administration (in charge of
China’s coast guard) but not the navy. The Foreign Ministry too is not authoritative enough.134 Also, the party’s International Liaison Department is not decisive
in general foreign policy; it weighs in only on specific issues (e.g., it appears to
have had a leading role in relations with the DPRK).
In short, there has been a clear tension between the need for quick decision
making and the multiplicity of organizational interests involved.135 In the decade
and a half after the NSLSG was set up, Chinese crisis-management experts,
including military ones, complained that China still lacked a powerful and authoritative crisis-management leadership hub that could effectively coordinate
military and civilian elements within a clearly defined legal framework of responsibilities.136 As one PLA study put it, citing internal critics, whether in terms
of composition or function the NSLSG system was unable effectively to “protect
national interest, preserve national security.”137
In light of all these problems, over the years many Chinese experts in the field
proposed various crisis-management decision-making mechanisms to replace or
reform the NSLSG. For example, in its 2003 study cited above, CICIR suggested
that an ideal system needs a small, powerful decision-making hub served by a
crisis-management general-staff mechanism.138 Diverse voices would need to be
heard in the process. Beneath this decision hub, there should be, CICIR argued,
an implementing agency composed of all relevant departments (national security,
police, fire, medical, health, transportation, etc.). A third structure would supply
timely, accurate intelligence; this information system would also be responsible
for domestic information management, so as to ensure social stability and prevent the loss of domestic control, thus giving the decision-making hub more
flexibility in a crisis.139 One gets the impression that these were lessons drawn by
CICIR from China’s own management of past crises, not just foreign examples.
PLA crisis-management experts also made suggestions for institutional reform. In 2008, Yu Qiaohua proposed a crisis-management “decision mechanism”
that would integrate decision making, implementation, propaganda, intelligence,
and “feedback.” It would be high level, small, and cross-bureaucratic.140 Some
of the most-detailed openly available proposals, however, came from NDU.141
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Among their core elements was that China should build a “National Security
Committee” on the basis of the existing NSLSG.142 Its membership would be
established in law and include the whole PBSC and the heads of the leading
military, diplomatic, intelligence, and economic organs. This committee would
design, prepare, and deploy a national security strategy. In crisis it would be
in charge of decision making. It would be served by a specialized intelligence
analysis unit to ensure the coordination of military (PLA) and state (Ministry
of State Security) intelligence and to eliminate the stovepiping of information.143
Within this committee would be a specialized “small group” with direct responsibility for development and execution of crisis-management contingency plans.
Subcommittees would be specifically tasked to manage security, domestic/social,
economic, and information/cyber aspects of a crisis. Beneath them would be
an advisory group of experts and specialists on particular relevant topics, duly
authorized to provide advice.
Providing further assistance, under the various NDU proposals, would be
organizations in functional departments. These would provide detailed contingency plans and feedback to upper levels. In particular, they would focus on
reducing frictions and inefficiencies in the military/civilian leadership systems,
in the military/civilian intelligence integration process, and in the lines of administrative control over homeland and border or frontier security.
In the last few years, in light of the failure of the NSLSG to become efficient in
crisis-management decision making, some experts suggested that the best that
could be hoped for was for the PBSC to pick one of its members as the recognized coordinator and implementer of national security decisions, since (as noted
above) no one below that level had authority to coordinate the State Council,
party, and PLA. But these experts recognized that to grant such authority to one
individual would likely run into two problems right from the start. First, it would
imply a diminution of the authority of other members of the PBSC, who would
be unlikely to accept any marginalization. Second, the PLA would be unlikely to
accept any arrangement that could downgrade its status and access, through the
CMC, to the top leader.144
I raise all this history as context for the decision in 2013 to set up the Central
National Security Committee (CNSC), headed by the party general secretary and
reporting to the PBSC. Reports about its composition, functioning, and scope are
still quite vague, and as of this date the CNSC has not interacted as an institution with another country’s equivalent decision-making units. In contrast to the
“leading small group” system, the CNSC is supposed to be permanent, though it
is not yet an unambiguously legally established national or party institution. The
CNSC handles both internal and external security issues. Much of the official
commentary on the institution stresses its internal security role;145 nevertheless,
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some Chinese analysts believe among its tasks will be external crisis management.146 Indeed, initial reports suggest that its main functional units are bureaus
for strategy, intelligence, and crisis management, as well as a comprehensive
bureau and an expert advisory group—elements intriguingly similar to the NDU
proposals.147
It remains to be seen, however, whether the CNSC can reduce the tension between the need during crises for centralized decision making at the very top and
the diversity of actors and interests involved. On the one hand, the CNSC explicitly places national-security
A deeply held belief that could affect crisispolicy decision making in the
management practice is the claim that Chihands of the party’s general
na’s people, history, and current policies are
secretary, who outranks the
uniquely peaceful and defensive, traits that are leaders of all security instirooted in ancient political philosophy, such as tutions and organizations,
Confucianism.
including the PLA members
of the CMC. Moreover, in
principle it moves the day-to-day management of national security policy up
from the party’s Foreign Affairs Office to its Central Office, the current head
of which, Li Zhanshu, is a member of the Politburo and thus outranks the state
councilor in charge of foreign affairs, Yang Jiechi. Li holds the same institutional
rank as the leading PLA members of the CMC but formally works on behalf of
the CNSC, which is headed by the general secretary.148 That association may give
him a degree of authority over the military members of the CMC.
On the other hand, it is unclear at this point how the new CNSC will actually
function once it is fully operational. Its first meeting did not occur until April
2014, too recently to allow judgments as to how efficient it will be in a highstakes, short-time-horizon dispute involving a real possibility of military escalation (e.g., a military crisis over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands). The functional
bureaus were supposed to be up and running by the end of 2014, but that date was
apparently missed. For another thing, the CNSC appears to be composed of the
same fifteen or sixteen institutions and interests that made up the old NSLSG—
the PLA, the Foreign Ministry, the security services, and the institutions handling
Hong Kong and Taiwan issues and minority affairs, among others.149 It is unclear
that Li Zhanshu or his successor as head of the General Office will be all that
involved in external crises, even though they are closer to the top leader than the
state councilor in charge of foreign affairs. Indeed, as of this date, the Foreign
Affairs Office continues to function, and some Chinese interlocutors believe the
state councilor in charge of foreign affairs will remain, for the foreseeable future,
a key interlocutor with foreign countries during a crisis.
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Finally, there are some unanswered questions concerning how the committee
will operate. One expert on crisis management from the National College of Administration has cautioned that the new CNSC will have to resolve the following
four issues.150 First, will it be mainly a decision-making body or a coordinating
body designed to ensure smooth coordination among military, diplomatic, and
other bureaucracies without replacing those institutions? Second, how will its
responsibilities be bounded, given it is supposed to balance “internal affairs and
external security”? (Xi Jinping has listed eleven types of security that would fall
under the CNSC: political, homeland, military, economic, cultural, social, science
and technology, information, ecological, resource, and nuclear. Presumably crises
in all of these areas would be analyzed and managed by the CNSC.)151 Third, what
is the constitutional and legal status of the CNSC? It is currently defined as both
a leadership organ directly under the authority of the party center and a state institution.152 Its legal status affects its legitimacy and thus its effectiveness. Finally,
will the CNSC have a sufficiently large, professional, and specialized staff to improve the flow of information inputs and decision outputs, and reduce parochial
conflicts between participating departments and organizations?
That these are all still open questions well after the party stood up the CNSC
suggests that it is unclear whether the new committee will fully fix the problems
in decision making identified by China’s crisis-management specialists. As of this
writing (mid-2015), Chinese interlocutors consistently state that the CNSC is
neither fully staffed nor functioning as a decision-making institution.
Command and Control Problems
Another question at the heart of military crisis management is how to employ
the PLA to send clear signals and, if necessary, to respond to low-scale military
challenges. Some Chinese specialists think that the nation’s options for using the
PLA in a crisis are underdeveloped. They contend that it has engaged in purposeful military signaling almost solely on the Taiwan issue, raising the likelihood
that should Chinese leaders try in other crisis situations to use the PLA to send
political signals these will not be read correctly.153
Moreover, given the lack of experience among current Chinese leaders in
coordinating diplomatic and military actions in crises, some Chinese experts
believe that they may overreact to initial military moves by the other side. When
Chinese leaders believe that a crisis is mainly diplomatic in nature, they may be
reluctant initially to use the PLA for signaling purposes. This means that if other
states resort to military means early on, in a crisis, even if only symbolically—for
instance, shifting from “white-hull” (coast guard) to gray-hull (navy) assets—
Chinese decision makers may believe the situation has evolved more quickly than
they had expected to a serious military crisis and respond by escalating.
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Beginning around 2005, there seems to have been some attempt to puzzle
through how military power can be used in crisis management in ways that
balance restraint (and thus downward pressure on escalation) with effective coercion to get the other side to exercise restraint itself. The PLA’s Wang Yong, for
instance, taking a close look at U.S. behavior in military crises, isolated a number
of ways in which military power could be used by political leaders in preventing, or acting during, a military crisis. These modes ranged from using aircraft
carrier groups (as signals of interest in particular areas or issues) to isolating or
quarantining adversaries.154
Restrained employment of military power in crises, however, requires systematized and institutionalized analysis and planning in order to produce a useful
set of rules, procedures, and templates for civilian leaders.155 As noted earlier, in
2006 the CMC approved the Overall Contingency Plans for the Military’s Handling
of Sudden Incidents, which specifically identified five crisis-management tasks
for the PLA, the first being the handling of military crises including border and
territorial disputes.156 The PLA has also set up an Emergency Response Leading Small Group, supported by the GSD Operations Department’s Emergency
Response Office and its twenty-four-hour emergency-response duty office. The
GSD Emergency Response Office is responsible for coordinating PLA responses
and when necessary coordinating with civilian units in all types of sudden incidents, domestic and external.
In addition, according to the 2006 Overall Contingency Plans, under certain
circumstances division- and regiment-level commands could skip over the nexthigher echelon in reporting on a crisis. Similarly, higher-level commanders could
skip intermediate echelons to control forces. The point would be to have as flat a
command structure as possible. In a crisis concerning national sovereignty, the
purpose of this flexibility would be to reduce the intervening command nodes
and speed up the response.157
That said, PLA crisis-management specialists are concerned that the PLA
command structure is still primarily designed to fight and win more-traditional
wars rather than to handle limited border crises. They fear that the PLA still
does not train or arm itself in sufficiently diverse ways to respond to the myriad
new operational scenarios that fall within international military crisis management (under the rubric of nonwar military actions). NDU experts, for instance,
complain that the PLA has insufficient reconnaissance, early warning, and positioning capabilities to operate effectively in defense of maritime interests. Its
personnel, they hold, need more political and psychological training to deal with
large-scale terrorist attacks and informational uncertainty and rumor-mongering
in complex political crises. It needs to revise fighting methods and its concepts
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for a broad range of land and sea border crisis operations (e.g., how to blockade,
intercept, deter, control, or defeat enemy actions).158
Moreover, according to these PLA analysts, traditional wartime command
structures make it difficult in a crisis situation to coordinate with all the nonPLA units and organizations that are often involved (e.g., the various central,
provincial, and local ministries, government agencies, and armed units involved
in, say, border security, such as the People’s Armed Police [PAP], the Public
Security Bureau, and the people’s militia).159 Some PLA planners have worried, for instance, that the response time for getting soldiers to crisis areas is
too long and that plans for physically setting up command posts to coordinate
operations, communications, intelligence, logistics, and security in local areas
are underdeveloped.160
Indeed, in recent years, the PLA has investigated different types of command
models for handling NWMA including border or frontier crises.161 One model
would rely on a two-tiered command structure comprising a high(er)-level
department’s emergency management office and the local area command most
directly affected—that is, the “key point.” The key point command organ would
have authority to command forces from different branches and incorporate
personnel from units in charge of land-, ocean-, or air-frontier defense management (presumably including nonmilitary groups). If the crisis were large enough
to involve two or more war zones, the higher-level command authority would
be national. If, in contrast, the crisis were contained within one war zone, the
highest-level command authority would be the emergency management command office for that zone.
Another model for crisis command—for contingencies crossing two or more
military regions or war zones—would have three layers. At the top would be the
national-command emergency management or crisis response organization.
Below it would be a joint military-region–level emergency management or crisis
organization. Below that would be the local joint-command structure, comprising PLA, PAP, and land-, ocean-, or air-frontier defenses.
Under either model, first-line forces would need to have clear functions, rules,
and legal support so they can respond as quickly as possible. Command groups
dispatched to the scene of the crisis would also need more autonomy than they
currently have.162
Contingency Planning Problems
Regardless of level of command or how many layers of command there are, PLA
specialists suggest that the emergency-response or crisis-management command
organization at each level should fulfill a range of functions, foremost being
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FIGURE 5
MILITARY OPERATIONS UNDER NONWAR MILITARY ACTIONS
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planning crisis contingencies.163 These contingency plans would range from
overall contingency plans for border/frontier crises (for the national military
leadership, the military region and branch headquarters, and corps-level units)
all the way to localized plans distributed to units at the corps, division, brigade,
regiment, battalion, and company levels.
PLA crisis-management analysts envision contingency plans for three types of
responses or operations (see figure 5).164 The first is dealing with “armed intrusions
and infiltration” by the enemy. Here, according to PLA writings, military crisismanagement plans should focus on operations for interception, ambush, encirclement, and pursuit; confrontation and expulsion; and prevention of enemy
landing, control of key points, cutting off of the enemy’s retreat routes, and surrounding and elimination of the enemy. There should be limits, however, PLA
analysts believe, to these kinds of operations. In all such cases, command has
to pay special attention to the political implications of operations within and
beyond China’s boundaries. For instance, if an enemy aircraft infiltrates Chinese
airspace, it is better that it be shot down within the borders than just outside. Once
the enemy plane is between China’s boundary and the high seas, pursuit and attack should cease. Otherwise, should the enemy plane crash outside the border,
diplomatic image problems could be created that put China in a more passive or
defensive political position.
In the case of foreign military forces operating in disputed areas where China’s
control is weak and the foreign country is “nibbling” (canshi) away at Chinese territory, the response should be to use bilateral channels to communicate China’s
position, to engage in active military actions designed to deter further expansion, and if necessary to use force to expel the enemy from the disputed territory.
This might involve directly confronting enemy forces, mounting surprise flank
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attacks, cutting off routes of retreat, retaking small but easily defended parts of
disputed territory, cutting off enemy supplies, or grabbing a high-profile piece of
territory to shock and awe (in U.S. parlance) the adversary. The goal is to stop the
enemy from occupying territory and yet limit escalation.165 In this scenario, the
PLA’s actions, its own analysts insist, should be strictly subordinated to higherlevel orders and to the overall border-defense policy.166
A second type of operation might involve responding to “armed harassment.”
Here the key points of operations are gathering intelligence, warning of an attack,
laying ambushes, attacking, blocking, and pursuing. The principle guiding the
response should be, “Use firepower to strike; thoroughly eliminate.”167
A third type envisions sealing off or blocking access to the border. According
to PLA research on crisis operations, relevant scenarios might include refugees
fleeing domestic turmoil and trying to cross China’s border (e.g., a DPRK collapse
scenario); terrorists, ethnic separatists, or religious extremists on both sides of
the border trying to coordinate actions; or foreign “enemy forces” trying to enter
the country to engage in provocations. The situation most likely to require careful
coordination of diplomatic and military actions, however, would be an influx of
refugees from neighboring countries, such as the DPRK. Here, according to PLA
writing, the first goal would be to deter refugees from crossing the border, ideally
putting them in camps on their home country’s territory. If this were not possible,
China would set up camps just inside its border, well separated from local populations. The response would require a clear division of responsibilities between
the people’s militia, the police, the PAP, and PLA units, all under the command
of military region–level PLA staff but, owing to the political and diplomatic sensitivity of such a crisis, under the guidance of the national command authority
(tongshuai bu). Should there be among the refugees foreign military and political
officials fleeing persecution or hoping to reorganize once in China, the command
authorities would identify and disarm them, separate them from regular refugees,
cut them off from any contact with forces inside their home country, and wait
for higher-level political instructions. If these military and political officials were
allowed into China, they would be put in isolated supervision and control zones
(jianguan qu), in part to prevent foreign forces (such as from the United States)
from trying to extricate or eliminate them.168
It is unclear how far the PLA has gone in choosing among and implementing
these various options for command models, contingency plans, and operational
procedures. The material cited here on handling border crises suggests, however,
that such planning is certainly under way, as the sources go into considerable
detail, down to the tactical level, about how to handle foreign forces “nibbling”
at Chinese territory (e.g., India and various maritime claimants), refugees and
retreating military remnant forces (e.g., from a collapsed DPRK), or terrorists
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and ethno-religious separatists trying to cross the border (such as into Xinjiang
or Tibet).169
Chinese theorizing about international crisis management has evolved relatively
quickly within the last two decades. It is well grounded in key military (CFISS,
NDU, AMS, GLD) and civilian intelligence (CICIR) institutions. It accepts many
principles first developed by
The traditional wartime command structures American specialists. In addimake it difficult in a crisis situation to coordi- tion, within the last ten years,
nate with all the non-PLA units and organiza- both civilian and military
tions that are often involved.
decision makers appear to
have been wrestling with how
to set up decision-making mechanisms, planning procedures, and institutions
for operational coordination and control in a crisis. Crisis-management experts
have leveled considerable criticism at the structural (and ideational) obstacles
to efficient decision making, including a top-level decision process that is slow
and generally not especially well staffed or supported by an interagency policy
process.
That said, there is considerable tension between crisis-management principles, on the one hand, and some basic principles and orientations behind China’s
security decision making and military operations, on the other. These tensions
should not be surprising, and not all are unique to the China case: crisis management does challenge, to some degree, traditional military operational thinking.
It is likely that most militaries and national-security decision makers face similar
tensions and contradictions. Crisis management requires willingness to settle for
less-than-ideal outcomes. It requires restraint on issues that entail, by the definition of a crisis, high stakes. It requires very strict civilian oversight and control
to ensure that military operational preferences do not undermine political goals.
It requires a mind-set that is empathetic toward the concerns of the other side,
and it requires decision-making procedures that ensure careful study of the other
side’s interests.170 Related to empathy are institutionalized, high-level, protected
channels of communication between political leaders and between military operators of the two sides.
China’s crisis-management experts understand all these requirements and
have often advocated them in their writings.171 The key will be whether top civilian and military leaders can be convinced to incorporate crisis-management
principles and mechanisms into a leaner and more efficient civilian national
security decision-making system and whether that system can minimize the
impact of parochial military and paramilitary interests, intra-elite political competition, the ideology of territoriality, and Chinese exceptionalism. In this regard,
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if crisis-management dialogues and mechanisms were given a more central and
standard place in official U.S.-China military-to-military and political interactions, it is possible that the ideas of China’s crisis-management experts would
generate more attention at the top political levels in China. As a first step, China
and its various interlocutors—the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam—need to dialogue bilaterally at the track I (that is, formal and official) level
about internal mechanisms and exercises, by which each side might discern more
clearly the other’s redlines. They need further to engage each other about ways of
institutionalizing rapid and transparent cross-national communications between
the relevant military commands (e.g., U.S. Pacific Command and the General
Staff Department’s Operations Department) and between political leaders (e.g.,
regularly exercised and used communication channels between the U.S. national
security adviser and China’s equivalent). Finally, they must address the training
and procedures needed to enable political leaders to understand clearly, and thus
control, their respective militaries’ operational plans and rules of engagement.
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chuzhi tufa shijian yingji nengli yanjiu”
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pp. 16, 24, 101, 152.
61. Ibid., p. 276.
62. Xu Manshu, Guoji weiji yujing.
63. Interview with Chinese crisis-management
expert, Beijing, 2011.
64. Ding Bangquan, Tang Yongsheng, and Yu
Manshu, Guoji weiji guanli, pp. 32, 109.
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